From analysis of over two decades of data on US markets, we find that market-wide investor sentiment is positively related with IPO underpricing. This relationship is more pronounced for difficult-to-arbitrage firms. High sentiment periods are followed by lower long-run IPO returns, suggesting that sentiment does not proxy for unobservable fundamentals. We find some evidence that investor sentiment impacts IPO valuations, but this relationship is not robust. We also decompose investor sentiment into systematic and idiosyncratic components and find that both components influence the IPO pricing process. We infer that the degree of excess optimism or pessimism of investors matters in the pricing of IPOs. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that the behavior of investors impacts price formation in financial markets.
Introduction
An initial public offering is arguably the most important event in the life of the firm. The IPO is the first time shares in the firm are offered to the public and the pricing of the IPO is very sensitive to both fundamental and behavioral market conditions at the time of the IPO. In this paper, we examine the relationship between behavioral market conditions, i.e. investor sentiment and the IPO pricing process. We propose that investor sentiment has a systematic component which is due to market-wide sentiment, and an idiosyncratic (residual) component which is due to firm-specific sentiment.
Indeed, both the business press and the theoretical literature have emphasized that the IPO pricing process is influenced by the investor sentiment which is defined as excess optimism or excess pessimism of market participants unwarranted by fundamentals. For example, Tessera Technologies Inc. shares soared 42% in first-day trading "helped by improved investor sentiment" (Wall Street Journal, November, 2004) . In general, investment bankers believe that "when market sentiment turns negative, investors don't want to be buying IPOs" (Wall Street Journal, May, 2010) . Thus, anecdotal evidence suggests that sentiment plays a role in setting the first day return.
Similarly, theoretical literature argues that the arrival of generations of sentiment investors to the market deters rational arbitrageurs and causes asset prices to deviate from fundamentals even in the absence of fundamental risk (Delong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldamann, 1990) . Along that line, Kumar and Lee (2006) empirically show that stock prices deviate from fundamental value when the trading by sentiment investors is highly correlated, that is, when sentiment investors enter and leave the market together. Also, Baker and Wurgler (2006) take a top-down approach to characterizing sentiment and consider it a market-wide phenomenon. The IPO market is a natural setting in which stocks are difficult to value (Kim and Ritter, 1999) , sentiment investors trade aggressively (Dorn, 2009) , and arbitrage is limited (Geczy, Musto, and Reed, 2002) . Thus, the IPO pricing process is very likely to be impacted by market-wide sentiment, which may cause IPO prices to deviate from fundamentals (Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh, 2006) . Recent behavioral finance theories postulate that the run up in the IPO price on the first day of trading increases with the demand from sentiment investors (Derrien, 2005; Cornelli, Goldreich, and Ljungqvist, 2006; Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh 2006) . 1 Three studies empirically examine the relation between IPO underpricing and sentiment (Derrien, 2005; Cornelli, Goldreich, and Ljungqvist, 2006; and Dorn 2009) . These studies utilize unique characteristics of the European IPO markets where retail demand for IPOs is observable and they use this demand as their empirical proxy for firm-level investor sentiment and examine its impact on the IPO pricing process. However, these studies do not distinguish between the systematic component (which is caused by market-wide sentiment) and the idiosyncratic (residual) component of investor sentiment, as drivers of this impact.
We argue that the distinction between systematic and idiosyncratic components of sentiment is important, because the impact of systematic component is driven by sentiment investors who are entering and leaving the market together and, thus, it affects all IPOs in the market. Further, it will be more difficult for arbitrageurs to undo the effect of systematic component. Finally, market-wide sentiment is easier to measure and readily available to investors. In contrast, idiosyncratic component of sentiment is specific to the firm and is limited to a given IPO and arbitrageurs will find it easier to undo the effect of mispricing Hence, we expect systematic component to have greater impact on IPO pricing process than will idiosyncratic sentiment. It is likely that the impact of systematic component will reverse over a longer time period.
Our measures of market-wide sentiment draw on results from two well-established surveys conducted monthly by the University of Michigan and Conference Board: the Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS) and the Index of Consumer Confidence (CBIND). One of the primary objectives of these surveys is to capture the level of consumers' optimism or pessimism about the business climate in the US. The data in these surveys have been used by prior literature to proxy for market-wide investor sentiment and these proxies have been empirically shown to impact equity prices (Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006) . For example, Billet, Jiang, and Rego (2010) show that consumer sentiment contributes to market-wide investor sentiment in the US market. Because it is likely that consumer sentiment reflects the behavioral biases of consumers as well as the fundamentals of the US economy, we follow Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) and orthogonalize the ICS and the CBIND to a broad set of macroeconomic variables. After we remove the impact of fundamentals, the remaining residual is our empirical proxy for marketwide investor sentiment. We then relate market-wide sentiment to three elements of the IPO pricing process: IPO valuation, IPO underpricing, and IPO long-run returns.
To find an empirical proxy for investor sentiment, prior research utilizes observable retail demand for IPOs in pre-IPO markets (Derrien, 2005; Cornelli, Goldreich, and Ljungqvist, 2006; and Dorn 2009) . However, these data are unavailable for the US IPO market. The closest construct to the observable retail demand proxy is abnormal buying by retail investors on the first day of the IPO. Hence, we use this measure as the proxy for investor sentiment at the firm level. We then decompose investor sentiment into two components, a systematic component and an idiosyncratic component.
We study a sample of 5,198 US IPO firms over the period 1981 to 2009 and find that IPO underpricing increases with market-wide investor sentiment in a statistically significant and economically meaningful way. However, not all firms are impacted by sentiment in the same degree. We find that for difficult-to-arbitrage firms the positive relation between IPO underpricing and market-wide sentiment is more pronounced. We designate difficult-to-arbitrage firms as high tech firms, young firms, and firms with low institutional holding, high R&D expenditure, low sales, and low profitability. When we decompose the investor sentiment into the market component and the idiosyncratic component we find that both components are positively related to IPO underpricing. That is, when sentiment investors leave the market, IPO prices will revert to their fundamental values. In support of this result, we find that long-run IPO returns are negatively related to market-wide sentiment, especially for IPOs issued during positive sentiment periods. Interestingly, after controlling for market-wide sentiment, long-run returns are not related to idiosyncratic sentiment. We also find weak evidence that the IPO valuation at the offer date is positively related with market-wide sentiment. However, this relationship is not robust across different measures of IPO valuation. We conclude that there is no convincing evidence that underwriters exploit sentiment to obtain higher relative valuations for their IPO clients. Overall, our results show that market-wide investor sentiment is related to the three aspects of IPO pricing process.
Our contributions are as follows. First, we provide evidence that the pricing of IPOs is influenced by market-wide sentiment. Second, we provide further evidence that difficult-toarbitrage firms are more affected by the sentiment as suggested by Baker and Wurgler (2006) . Because our sample is based on US data that span over 25 years and include over 5,000 observations, we are able to provide cross-sectional results that prior literature, using small samples and short time periods, could not. Our cross-sectional results highlight that not all IPOs are equally impacted by market-wide sentiment, and that the degree of limits to arbitrage plays a crucial role in the impounding of market-wide sentiment into the IPO pricing process. Third, we find that IPO long-run returns are inversely related to market-wide sentiment. This suggests that in the long run the market does correct the issue-date mispricing of IPOs that results from market-wide sentiment. Fourth, we find weak evidence that investor sentiment impacts IPO valuations, but this relationship is not robust. This result is consistent with the notion that investment bankers understand the temporary nature of sentiment-driven valuations, and thus, to protect their long-term institutional investors from future price reversals, they do not incorporate the demand from irrational investors into the offer price. Fifth, prior literature has shown in a limited setting using specialized investor sentiment proxies that sentiment at the level of the firm is related to IPO underpricing. Our measure of market-wide sentiment spans a significant time period, across different countries, and can be used by investors who want to take advantage of sentiment-based mispricing. Finally, we add to the nascent sentiment literature by providing another setting in which sentiment plays a prominent role in price formation.
Finally we recognize that it is impossible to completely eliminate an unobservable risk factor as an explanation for our results. However, we believe that risk-based explanations are unlikely to account for our results for several reasons. First, the difference in one-day return, our main variable of interest, between high and low sentiment periods is 14%. It is difficult to imagine the difference in the level of risk between high and low sentiment periods that would require a compensation of 14% difference in one-day return. Second, our sentiment measure is orthogonal to nine macro variables which are correlated with fundamental levels of risk. For example, the consumption-to-wealth ratio (CAY) has been shown to be correlated with future returns (Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001) . Hence, it is unlikely that risk-based factors account for our results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 shows the results of the robustness check. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Literature review and research questions
In this section we describe prior literature related to behavioral aspects of IPO process and the prior literature related to investor sentiment.
Behavioral investor models in the IPO literature
Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006) model the optimal response of an issuer to the presence of sentiment investors who arrive in two stages. They assume that sentiment investors trade on sentiment and regular investors trade on fundamentals. Regular investors are assumed to hold the IPO shares during the first stage in order to resell them to sentiment investors who arrive in the second stage. If investor sentiment falls in the second stage (and sentiment investors do not arrive in the second period), the regular investors will suffer as they will be holding overpriced shares. To compensate regular investors for this possible loss, issuers underprice the IPO. They also predict that underpricing will increase with sentiment, because issuers will increase their offer size to maximize the funds raised from the issue. Regular investors hold a greater proportion of their portfolio in this expanded issue and need to be compensated for tying up additional funds in the IPO. Hence, the issuer will underprice the issue further during high sentiment periods.
Derrien (2005) develops a model of IPO pricing whereby underwriters extract private information from informed institutional investors and observe public information about investor sentiment. In this model high investor sentiment is only partially incorporated into the offer price because underwriters are committed to provide costly price support if the aftermarket price falls below the offer price. This makes underwriters conservative in setting the offer price, and thus leads to higher underpricing. Using a sample of 62 French IPOs underwritten by a modified bookbuilding procedure during the period 1999 to 2001 , Derrien (2005 finds that investor sentiment is positively related to underpricing. His proxy for the sentiment is the oversubscription of the fraction of the IPO reserved for individual investors.
Closest to our approach, Cornelli, Goldreich, and Ljungqvist (2006) empirically examine the relationship between both market-wide and firm-level investor sentiment and post-IPO prices in European markets. Their proxy for; market-wide investor sentiment is the return on the market index; their proxy for firm-level investor sentiment is the pre-IPO (or "grey") market prices that are available in European IPO markets. Using a sample of 486 IPOs in 12 European countries between November 1995 and December 2002, the authors document a positive relation between the grey market prices (firm-level investor sentiment) and post-IPO prices. They, however, do not find any relation between market-wide-investor sentiment and IPO underpricing. Internet bubble when the behavior of IPO market participants was atypical (e.g., Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003) . Ofek and Richardson (2003) argue that abnormal presence of retail investors in that period contributed to the formation of Internet bubble and hence these anomalous years are not representative of IPO markets in general. So, any findings from this period should be interpreted with caution. To ease this concern we use the sample that spans the periods before, during and after the Internet bubble and we show that investor sentiment impacts the IPO pricing process in non-bubble period.
Further, Jenkinson, Morrison, and Wilhelm (2006) report that differences between the US IPO market and European IPO market are non-trivial. For example, in the US exchange of information between investors and underwriters prior to registration is strictly prohibited, whereas in European IPOs there is an exchange of information even before initial price range is set. Further, in the US, analysts affiliated with the underwriter are allowed to produce their research reports only after the quiet period ends (40 days after the issue), whereas in Europe all analysts (whether or not affiliated with the underwriter) can start producing research right after the underwriter is appointed, many months before the issue of the IPO. Another difference is that the initial price range in the US is non-binding and half of US IPOs are priced outside of initial price range, whereas this fraction is only 10% in IPOs issued in Europe.
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Differences in timing of communication and the flexibility of initial price range may impact the sensitivity of the IPO process to the sentiment, and it is not obvious that implications from the European IPO markets will apply to the US IPO market.
Investor sentiment literature
Sentiment investors trade based on noise (sentiment) rather than on fundamental information (Black, 1986) . In classical finance theory, investor sentiment has no role in setting prices because arbitrageurs take positions that are opposite to those taken by sentiment investors and drive them out of the market. However, Delong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldamann (1990) model continual generations of sentiment investors arriving to the market, and show that in conjunction with limits to arbitrage these investors cause asset prices to deviate from fundamentals. Baker and Wurgler (2006) suggest that not only do prices deviate from fundamentals for the whole market, but this effect is more prominent for hard-to-value and difficult-to-arbitrage stocks, such as small firms, young firms, growth and value firms, nondividend-paying firms, and loss-making firms.
Prior literature has measured investor sentiment in terms of a market variable, such as closed-end fund discount (Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler, 1991) , or a combination of market variables, such as the principal component from closed end fund discount, first day IPO returns, number of IPOs in a month, proportion of equity in capital raising, turnover, and dividend premium (Baker and Wurgler, 2006) . Other studies use surveys to measure investor sentiment, such as, the Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index and the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006; Qiu and Welch, 2006) . Qiu and Welch (2006) conclude that Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index and Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index best capture the behavior of sentiment investors because these measures are most closely related to more direct proxy which is the UBS/Gallup investor sentiment survey. 
Research Design

Sample Selection
IPO underpricing
Underpricing is the percentage change in the price between the offer price and the firstday closing price. The first-day closing price is the first recorded closing price available in CRSP if it is within seven days of the offer date as reported in SDC.
IPO valuation at the offer date
To examine how underwriters value IPOs relative to similar publicly traded firms, we construct comparable firms based on P/Vsales and P/Vebitda following Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) . Specifically, we choose a publicly traded non-IPO firm in the same industry which has comparable sales and EBITDA profit margin, and which did not go public within the past three years. To select a matching firm, we start with all firms in Compustat for the fiscal year prior to the IPO year. Then we eliminate firms that went public during the past three years, firms whose securities traded are not ordinary common shares, REITs, closed-end funds, ADRs, and firms with a stock price less than five dollars as of the previous June or December, whichever is later. We then group firms into the 48 Fama and French (1997) industries, based on SIC codes in CRSP at the end of the previous calendar year. Within every industry, we group firms into three portfolios based on past sales; within every industry-sales portfolio, we group firms again into three portfolios based on past EBITDA profit margin. We then slot each IPO into one of these nine portfolios and select the non-IPO firm with the closest sales to the IPO firm's within the matched portfolio. If the matched firm cannot be obtained with this 3X3 classification, we use 3X2 and 2X2 classifications along the same lines as described above. After finding the matching firms for all IPOs, we compute two price-to-value ratios, P/Vsales and P/Vebitda, following equations (1) to (6) described below. For the IPO sample, we use shares outstanding at the close of the offer date. For the matching firms, we use market price and shares outstanding at the close of the day immediately prior to the IPO offer date. The above three variables are taken from CRSP.
Survey based proxies for market-wide investor sentiment
Next, we turn to variables related to survey-based proxies for market-wide investor 
Fundamentals of the economy are measured using a set of nine macroeconomic variables.
We measure the macroeconomic variables in the same manner as Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) . These are dividend yield, default spread, yield on the three-month Treasury bill, GDP growth, consumption growth, labor income growth, unemployment rate, CPI, and consumption to wealth ratio.
Dividend yields (DIV) is measured as the total ordinary cash dividend of the CRSP valueweighted index over the last three months deflated by the value of the index at the end of the current month. The value of the index is the CRSP value-weighted returns monthly index without dividends, as in Fama and French (1988) and Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) . Default spread (DEF) is measured at a monthly frequency, and is the difference between the yield to maturity on Moody's Baa-rated and Aaa-rated bonds, taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. The inflation rate (CPI) is measured monthly and obtained from CRSP. Consumption-to-wealth ratio (CAY) is taken from data provided by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) . We measure sentiment at a monthly frequency and some of the macroeconomic variables are already at a monthly frequency. However, others like GDP growth, consumption growth, labor income growth, and consumption-to-wealth ratio, are available at a quarterly frequency and thus take on the same value for all the months in a particular quarter.
The residual from the above equation is termed ICSR and CBINDR respectively when the consumer sentiment variable is ICS and CBIND. The residual denotes the excess optimism or pessimism of consumers and is our proxy for investor sentiment.
Systematic and idiosyncratic components of investor sentiment
In this section we first describe variables related to investor sentiment. Next, we decompose sentiment into systematic and idiosyncratic components. Specifically, investor sentiment is proxied by the abnormal order flow of small traders for that IPO. We use trade size to separate small traders from institutional traders. Previous literature suggests that individuals trade in small dollar value size lots. Lee (1992) reports survey-based evidence to support this conjecture. He also argues that while large traders may break up their orders into medium-sized orders, for a variety of reasons they do not trade in very small lots. Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) compare the size-based classification of investors to their actual identities obtained from the TORQ database, and find that trade size does a good job of separating individual trades from institutional trades. Not surprisingly, a large number of papers have used trade size as a proxy for small versus large investors (see, for example, Battalio and Mendenhall, 2005; Bhattacharya, 2001; and Chakravarty, 2001 ).
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The use of the well-accepted trade size proxy allows us to examine the influence of sentiment of small investors over a longer time period of 1994-2008 11 . This measure of investor sentiment is similar in spirit to the proxy for investor sentiment in Derrien (2005), which is the oversubscription of the fraction of the IPO allocated for retail investors, and to the proxy for investor sentiment in Cornelli, Goldreich, and Ljungqvist (2006) and Dorn (2009), which is "grey market" pre-IPO trading. These authors argue, as do we, that investor sentiment impacts prices through trading by noise traders, who are usually thought to be retail investors (see, e.g.,
Kumar and Lee, 2006).
We use the Trade and Quotation (TAQ) dataset which contains information about each executed trade for each stock. When the dollar amount of a trade is less than or equal to $5,000, we assume the trade is executed by a small investor and is consistent with the prior literature (Bhattacharya, 2001) . Defining small trades using such a low cutoff allows us to minimize the impact of large traders who split their trades into small lots and are then incorrectly classified as small investors. However, because the dollar trade size would be large for high-priced stocks even in small trade lots, we follow Asthana, Balsam, and Sankaraguruswamy (2004) and modify the above classification for stocks whose prices exceed $50. For these stocks, we classify trades below 100 shares as trades by small investors. To ensure that our results are not driven by stock price movements around the event date, the dollar values of all trades associated with an IPO are calculated by using the average of the daily share prices during the third month after the IPO.
10 Admittedly, the use of trade size may not provide evidence on the trading behavior of individuals as clean as that documented from the detailed datasets used in some prior studies. For example, Odean (1998) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) have the exact identity of the investors. However, such detailed datasets cover only a limited time period of two or three years. 11 TAQ data is not available prior to 1994.
After identifying trades executed by small investors, we follow the methodology developed by Lee and Ready (1991) to classify each trade as either buyer-initiated (i.e., a buy) or seller-initiated (i.e., a sell). The Lee-Ready algorithm matches a trade's execution price to the most recent quote. If the trade's execution price is above (below) the midpoint of the bid-ask spread, it is classified as a buy (sell). In cases where the trade execution price is at the midpoint of the bid-ask spread, the trade is classified based on a "tick-test." An uptick classifies a trade as a buy and a down-tick as a sell. We only consider the trades executed between 9:30am and 4:00pm, because the exact time of execution and quotes become less reliable outside of the normal market hours.
We define order flow, NetBuy, as the difference between the number of shares in buyerinitiated transactions and number of shares in seller-initiated transactions.
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We then follow Asthana, Balsam, and Sankaraguruswamy (2004) and define the abnormal order flow of small investors for IPO i on event date t which is the first trading date after the IPO date as ANetBuy i,t that is computed as follows.
where µ i and σ i are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of the daily order flow of the investor group for the IPO during the estimation period. The estimation period ranges from day +30 to day +60 relative to the event date. Because there is no "grey market" in the US, and hence ex-ante retail trading and prices of IPOs are unobservable, we have no option but to use ex-post data to proxy for investor sentiment. Thus, there is a look-ahead bias in the measurement of the trading-based sentiment variable. In order to alleviate concerns about using data unavailable at the time of IPO, we perform additional tests using a daily order flow of a matching firm and standardized daily order flow. Our results are not sensitive to these alternative definitions.
Another possible concern is that in recent years, the practice of splitting orders has become common because of increases in program trading and changes in the tick size (Cloyd, Li 12 Our results remain robust if we measure order flow in terms of dollar volume of shares traded instead of number of shares traded. and Weaver, 2006). Specifically, large orders from institutions are split into small orders. Hence, our algorithm to identify small traders based on trade size may result in misclassification of large traders as small traders and introduce noise in the measurement of small trader sentiment.
Further, short sales can be misclassified as buyer-initiated by the Lee-Ready algorithm since short sales are allowed only on the uptick (Edwards and Hanley, 2010) . Hence, to alleviate these concerns we include the post-2000 dummy variable and interact it with variables of interest in our tests and find that our results are robust.
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To arrive at the systematic and idiosyncratic components we regress ANETBUY on ICSR. The predicted value of ANETBUY is the systematic component, and the residual from the regression is the idiosyncratic component of investor sentiment.
Control variables
To delineate the impact of investor sentiment, we control for other known determinants of IPO underpricing that have been documented by prior literature. Revision is the percentage change from the midpoint of the filing range to the offer price. Hanley (1993) shows that underwriters partially adjust the price during the bookbuilding process and that Revision is positively related to underpricing. Lowry and Schwert (2004) show that the impact of partial adjustment is asymmetric between upward and downward revision. Thus, we define Revision + as equal to Revision if Revision is positive, and zero otherwise. Underwriter ranks are defined as in Carter and Manaster (1990) , and as updated by Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) and Loughran and Ritter (2004) . Underwriter ranks data are obtained from Ritter's website. MaxRank is the maximum of all the lead managers' ranks.
14 Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) document a negative relation between underwriter ranks and underpricing.
However, Beatty and Welch (1996) report that the negative correlation reverses after the 1990s (see also Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Hansen, 2001; Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt, 2005; Liu and Ritter, 2011 2004; Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003; and Megginson and Weiss, 1991) . (median=9.09%). In contrast, the average underpricing for firms going public in low sentiment periods is only 13.71% (median=6.82%). The difference in the average underpricing is 14.03%
Results
Descriptive statistics
and is statistically significant (p-value=0.000). The average revision (Revision) in price from the midpoint of the filing range to the offer price is positive (mean=3.29%, median=0.00%) for IPOs offered in the high sentiment periods, whereas it is negative (mean= -0.88%, median=0.00%) for
IPOs offered in the low sentiment periods. The difference in the averages is significant. We find that a greater number of hi-tech (HiTech) firms go public in high sentiment periods than in low sentiment periods. Further, younger firms go public more often in high sentiment periods than in low sentiment periods. The average Age is 13.921 years (median=7 years) during high sentiment periods, whereas average Age is 16.115 years (median=9 years) during low sentiment periods.
[Insert Table 2 ]
Sentiment and IPO valuation at the offer date
Theoretical literature in behavioral finance suggests that underwriters set the offer price to take advantage of the prevailing market sentiment, but they do not fully incorporate the effects of sentiment. These models suggest that the offer price is increasing in sentiment. We test whether managers set the offer price higher (lower) for IPO firms in high (low) sentiment periods to take advantage of the prevailing sentiment. As described in Section 3.3 we adopt the methodology suggested by Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) , and construct comparable firms. The two valuation metrics of interest are P/Vsales and P/Vebitda. These measure the excess valuation of the IPO firm over a comparable non-IPO firm. The following regression model tests the relation between sentiment and valuation of IPO firms.
MaxRank_BF1990 + α 5 HiTech+ α 6 Venture + α 7 NASDAQ + α 8 Age + α 9 DecShrOffer+ α 10
Columns 1 and 3 of Table 3 present the result of testing the relationship between valuation at the offer date and market-wide investor sentiment. Both P/Vsales and P/Vebitda are winsorized at 1% level to remove the impact of outliers. We see that P/Vebitda is positively associated with market-wide investor sentiment (ICSR), whereas P/Vsales is not. In columns 2 and 4, we present the results after decomposing investor sentiment into systematic and idiosyncratic components. P/Vebitda is still positively associated with the systematic component of investor sentiment, whereas P/Vsales is not. We also find that neither P/Vsales nor P/Vebitda is related to the idiosyncratic component. Hence, we do not find convincing evidence that underwriters set the offer price more aggressively when investor sentiment is high. These results hold after controlling for other factors that are likely to impact valuation. Kim and Ritter (1999) show that the valuation ratios using comparable firms are noisy, which may account for the lack of significance level. Note that the number of observations in columns 2 and 4 is smaller because the sample period changes to post-1993 due to the availability of TAQ data necessary to Overall, we do not find robust evidence that underwriters take advantage of investor sentiment when pricing the IPO relative to similar publicly traded firms. This result is consistent with the notion that investment bankers understand the temporary nature of sentiment-driven valuations and do not incorporate the demand from sentiment investors into the offer price in order to protect long-term institutional investors from future price reversals.
[Insert 
Column 1 of Table 4 shows the results of estimating equation (11). We see that ICSR is significant and positive. This result shows that as market-wide sentiment increases, underpricing also increases. Column 2 of Table 4 Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) document a negative relation between underwriter ranks and underpricing. These two papers argue that prestigious underwriters select less risky IPOs, and that their reputation serves as a signal of firm quality, which in turn reduces underpricing. We find that the coefficient on MaxRank_BF1990 is negative and significant consistent with findings by Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) . However, Beatty and Welch (1996) [Insert Table 4] Up to this point, we used the abnormal order flow of small investors (ANetBuy) as a proxy for investor sentiment. The benchmark against which the order flow of the IPO date is measured in this proxy is the order flow of the IPO firms in the window [+30, +60] after IPO date. As mentioned earlier, this benchmark is measured after the IPO and, hence, this measure is subject to look-ahead bias. To alleviate the consequent concern about using data unavailable at the time of the IPO, we create two other measures. First, we use a matching-firm approach. [Insert Table 5 ]
ANetBuy_Match equals NetBuy of IPOs by small investors on the first trading date in TAQ minus
Sentiment and IPO long-run returns
If sentiment impacts IPO prices through a behavioral channel, the prices will eventually revert to the fundamental value when sentiment investors exit the market. Also, the long-run tests allow us to rule out information based explanations for the underpricing results that we document. Sherman and Titman (2002) (13) and (14). Panel A indicates that long-run returns (2, 3, 6, and 12 months) are negatively related to market-wide sentiment (ICSR) in high sentiment periods. This finding suggests that the impact of sentiment is due to behavioral reasons. However, in low sentiment periods, the coefficients on market-wide sentiment (ICSR) are negative, but not significant at conventional levels. Panels C and D indicate that long-run returns are negatively related to the Systematic component of investor sentiment in both high-and low-sentiment periods. On the other hand, Idiosyncratic component is not related to long-run returns. Surprisingly, the relationship is significant for returns over a short window (2-and 3-months returns). Underwriter reputation is positive and significant, suggesting that reputable underwriters are associated with IPOs that lose less value in the long run. However, the relationship for Venture-backed IPOs and long-run returns is mixed.
Abnormal Return
Overall, Table 6 indicates that IPOs revert to their fundamental values over the long run, a result consistent with the notion that market-wide sentiment has a behavioral component. This provides further evidence that our measure of market-wide sentiment proxies for excess optimism or pessimism of investors.
[Insert Table 6 ]
Cross-sectional analysis
This section documents results relating to the cross-sectional differences in the impact of sentiment on IPO underpricing. Baker and Wurgler (2007) suggest that difficult-to-arbitrage stocks are more susceptible to investor sentiment. We classify difficult-to-arbitrage stocks as those which are in the high tech industry, young firms, firms with a low fraction of institutional holdings, firms with low sales, firms with high R&D expenditure, and firms with a low profitability in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. Stocks with these characteristics are more difficult to value and arbitrage; hence, the effect of sentiment on underpricing is likely to be more significant for these stocks. We classify HiTech stocks as defined in SDC, young firms as firms below median of the Age distribution in our sample of IPOs, lower institutional ownership stocks as stocks below the sample median of the institutional holdings reported in 13F filings at the end of the first quarter after the IPO. Similarly, firms below the median of sales in the year before the IPO are classified as firms with low sales, firms above the median of the R&D expenditure as high R&D firms, and firms below median profitability as low profitability firms. To combine above cross-sectional factors into one variable we first rank each variable into deciles in order to mitigate the impact of outliers and non-linearities. Next, we conduct factor analysis and classify firms with principal factor value less than the sample median as difficult-to-arbitrage firms. We separately estimate equation (11) for more difficult-to-arbitrage firms and less difficult-toarbitrage firms. Columns 1 and 2 of panel A of table 7 describe the results. As expected, the effect of market-wide sentiment on underpricing is stronger in more difficult-to-arbitrage firms..
The difference in coefficients on market-wide sentiment between more and less difficult-toarbitrage firms is significant. In columns 1 and 2 of panel B of Table 7 , we examine the effect of
Systematic and Idiosyncratic components of investor sentiment on underpricing for more and less difficult-to-arbitrage firms. Similar to market-wide sentiment, the coefficients on the Systematic and Idiosyncratic components are stronger in more difficult-to-arbitrage firms.
Interestingly, the effect of the Idiosyncratic component is not significant for less difficult-toarbitrage firms.
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Robustness tests
In this section, we estimate alternative specifications of the models described above in order to test the robustness of results. We estimate monthly regressions, exclude influential observations, control for the Internet bubble period, control for hot IPO markets, and control for future real economic activity. In the interest of brevity, we do not tabulate these results, but they are available from the authors upon request.
Correlation among IPOs issued in the same month
We have documented so far that IPO underpricing increases with investor sentiment.
However, the sentiment variable is the same for all firms going public within the same month.
We addressed this issue in the main tests by clustering standard errors by month. Another way would be to estimate monthly regressions of equation (11). We take the averages of both dependent and independent variables described in equation (11) across all IPOs during a month. Table 4 , we find that market-wide sentiment and Systematic and 17 Instead of using factor analysis, we use principal component and the results are the same.
Consistent with results from
Idiosyncratic components of investor sentiment are positively related to underpricing. Some months have very few IPOs, and this would introduce noise in the above monthly regression.
After we remove months with fewer than 2 IPOs, we find that the results are robust. Finally, because each month has a different number of IPOs, we estimate a weighted monthly regression using number of IPOs in a month as the weight. We continue to find that both market-wide sentiment and Systematic and Idiosyncratic components of investor sentiment are positively related to underpricing.
Influential observations
IPO underpricing is notorious for having extreme values. For example, the shares of VA Linux in December 1999 were offered at $30 and closed at $239.25 on the first day of trading, for a first day return of 698 % (Loughran and Ritter, 2004) . In another example, Globe.com IPO shares had 900 % first day return (DuCharme, Rajgopal and Sefcik, 2001 ). Although our sample spans over 5,000 observations, a remote possibility is that the empirical results are affected by a small number of influential observations. To identify influential observations we follow Belsley, Kuh, and Welch (1980) and drop eight observations with the highest and the smallest distance values. We find that the relation between investor sentiment and IPO underpricing remains positive and significant.
Bubble period
We have documented thus far that underpricing increases with investor sentiment.
However, our sample period includes the Internet bubble. Business press and academic literature are unanimous that this period was unusual due to the unique nature of emerging Internet business, unprecedented media hype, and widespread presence of retail investors (see Schultz and Zaman, 2001; Ofek and Richardson, 2003; and DuCharme, Rajgopal and Sefcik, 2001 ).
Hence, because it is possible that our overall results are influenced by this specific time period, we drop IPOs issued during the bubble period (between January 1999 and March 2000) and reestimate equations (11) and (12). We find that market-wide sentiment (ICSR) is positively related with underpricing, which implies a positive relation between underpricing and investor sentiment in the non-bubble period. The Systematic component is positively related to IPO underpricing, but interestingly enough, the Idiosyncratic component is not significantly related to IPO underpricing during the non-bubble period.
Hot and cold IPO markets
Helwege and Liang (2004) show that hot IPO markets, identified by high number of IPOs, have higher underpricing and lower long-run returns. This evidence is also consistent with our findings on the impact of investor sentiment on the IPO pricing process. To separate the effect of hot IPO markets and high sentiment, we control for the number of IPOs in equation (11) and (12). Consistent with Helwege and Liang (2004) the number of IPOs is significantly related to underpricing and long-run returns. We note that all our results remain robust to this alternative specification.
Future real economic activity
We have removed the macro-economic effects from our raw sentiment measures by regressing ICS on a set of current and lagged macro-economic variables following Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) . However, it is still possible that the residual part of consumer sentiment may influence future real economic activity. For example, if consumers are optimistic (rationally or irrationally) about their personal purchasing power and the overall economy, this excess optimism may influence their spending in the future (Carroll, Fuhrer, and Wilcox, 1994; Qiu and Welch, 2006) . In that case, consumer sentiment may have a real impact on increased future consumer spending and this, in turn, may lead to increased future corporate profits. Naturally, the question arises whether market-wide sentiment impacts IPO pricing through direct behavioral channels or indirectly through real economic activity (or both). To answer this question, we decompose our sentiment measure into a component due to future real economic activity (ICSR_P) and a component due to direct behavioral channel (ICSR_R). Then, we estimate the regressions described in Eqs. (11) and (12) using these alternative sentiment variables. We note that the coefficient for ICSR_P is positively and significantly related with underpricing, which suggests that sentiment affects underpricing through future real economic activity. At the same time, the coefficient for ICSR_R is also positive and significant, indicating that market-wide sentiment impacts IPO underpricing through the direct behavioral channel as well. Overall, these results indicate that market-wide sentiment impacts the IPO pricing process through both future real economic activity and behavioral channels.
Conclusion
We examine the impact of market-wide sentiment and systematic and idiosyncratic components of investor sentiment on the IPO pricing process. Extant theoretical literature implies that sentiment investors come and leave the market together and, thus, that the IPO pricing process is impacted by market-wide sentiment. However, empirical literature, possibly as a result of data limitations or lack of an appropriate proxy, has not been able to document this impact of market-wide sentiment on the IPO pricing process. We bridge this gap between theoretical and empirical work and show evidence that the IPO pricing process is influenced by market-wide sentiment. In addition, when we decompose investor sentiment into systematic and idiosyncratic components, we find that both components impact the IPO pricing process significantly.
Our analysis produces several important findings. This is the first study to provide empirical evidence that the pricing of IPOs is influenced by market-wide sentiment. Second, we find further evidence that difficult-to-arbitrage firms are more affected by the sentiment, as suggested by Baker and Wurgler (2006) . Third, we find no conclusive evidence that IPO valuations are influenced by the sentiment. Fourth, high IPO secondary market valuations do not last as long run returns are negatively related to sentiment. Fifth, we provide evidence that sentiment impacts IPO pricing process directly through the behavioral channel and indirectly through real economic activity. Finally, we add to the sentiment literature by providing another setting in which sentiment plays a prominent role in price formation. Our results are consistent with the notion that the behavior of investors impacts the price formation in financial markets.
More broadly, our findings support a role for investor sentiment in financial markets. 
DIV
Dividend yield is measured as the total cash ordinary dividend of the CRSP value-weighted index over the last three months and divided by the value of the index at the end of the current month, calculated with the CRSP value-weighted returns monthly index without dividend, as in Fama and French (1998) and Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006 This table summarizes the cross-sectional analysis. Column 1 is for more difficult-to-arbitrage IPO firms which are more prone to sentiment. Column 2 is for less difficult-to-arbitrage IPO firms which are less prone to sentiment. Using factor analysis we classify more difficult-to-arbitrage stocks as those which are in the high tech industry, young firms, firms with a low fraction of institutional holdings, firms with low sales, firms with high R&D expenditure and firms with a low profitability in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. The dependent variable is underpricing, which is the percentage change in the price between the offer price and the first-day closing price. Revision is the percentage change from the midpoint of the filing range to the offer price. Revision + equals to one if the Revision is positive, zero otherwise. MaxRank is the maximum of all the lead managers' ranks. MaxRank_BF1990 equals to MaxRank if the IPO is issued before 1990, zero otherwise. HiTech equals to one if the IPO firm is in high tech industry, zero otherwise. Venture equals to one if the IPO firm is backed by venture capitalists, zero otherwise. NASDAQ equals to one if the IPO is listed on NASDAQ, zero otherwise. Age is the number of years between the founding year and the IPO year. Decshroffer takes the values from 1 to 10, by ranking ShrOffer into deciles for the IPOs in the same year. ShrOffer is the number of shares offered in the IPO, in millions. Sales is the sales for the prior fiscal year before offering from Compustat, in billion. Year is the IPO issue year. We omit control variables for brevity. *, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
